Flood is the most frequent and costly of U.S. natural disasters with losses expected to increase due to climate change. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) mandates flood insurance purchase for properties with federally-backed mortgages in the 100-year floodplain. We propose that mandatory flood insurance purchase be extended to all property in the 500-year floodplain.
3 more than 6 million from 2009 to 2017 (Statista, n.d.) , which, coupled with the decrease in flood insurance policies in-force, implies that the participation rate has decreased nationally over the same period. Considering the increased frequency and severity of flooding, this suggests that fewer households in high risk areas are protected by flood insurance.
A low flood insurance participation rate is a root cause of both the NFIP's debt and its ineffectiveness in managing flood losses and reducing federal flood disaster payments. Increased participation could reduce the burden on taxpayers in several ways. Any payment by an NFIP policy for flood losses directly reduces the amount of disaster assistance the policyholder can receive. In addition, after a flood loss, an NFIP policyholder can receive funds to pay for mitigation to reduce the severity of losses in future flood events. Increasing the number and risk diversity of properties covered by the NFIP would create a more sustainable risk pool 3 that limits further NFIP debt and reduces both the amount of federal disaster aid paid and non-covered losses borne by flood victims.
The focus of this paper is on the flood insurance participation rate and making the case for expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond the 100-year floodplain to include the 500-year floodplain. Currently, the only property owners required to have flood insurance are those with federally-backed mortgages in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), also known as the 100-year floodplain, which are areas that have at least a one percent chance of flooding annually.
Properties in the 500-year floodplain have at least a 0.2 percent likelihood of flooding annually. 4 We use the term "participation rate" in this Commentary interchangeably with other commonly used terms such as "take up rate" and "penetration rate".
We argue that such an expansion is an important step in stabilizing the NFIP, substituting insurance for federal disaster aid payments, and improving flood loss recovery for property owners. If the purchase of flood insurance is voluntary, the expectation of receiving disaster aid can crowd out the demand for flood insurance (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kousky, Michel-Kerjan, & Raschky, 2013; Lewis & Nickerson, 1989; Raschky, Schwarze, Schwindt, & Zahn, 2013; Raschky & Weck-Hannemann, 2007) . Even those who purchase flood insurance after a flood loss tend to let coverage lapse after two to four years (Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, & Kunreuther, 2012 ).
In addition, expanding the purchase requirement to property in the 500-year floodplain would provide more incentive for property owners to pressure their local government to participate in the Community Rating System (CRS) and for those communities participating to try to increase their CRS Class rating, which results in flood insurance discounts for the entire community. A community's CRS rating can be improved in various ways, including investments in infrastructure improvements or infrastructure management and planning that reduce flood risk. An expanded flood insurance purchase mandate could also alleviate problems caused by inaccurate Flood
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), which result in underestimating property risk and not purchasing flood insurance. The current FIRMs appear to drastically underestimate the number of properties that are in the 100-year flood zone (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2017; Wing et al., 2018) .
Federal flood insurance is available for properties in communities that have qualified for participation in the NFIP. To qualify, the community must submit a floodplain management plan 5 that at least meets the minimum NFIP requirements. Currently, about 22,000 U.S. communities participate in the NFIP (Marsh LLC, 2015) . An NFIP-qualified community can participate in the CRS and work to improve its CRS Class rating to earn flood insurance premium discounts for its residents. The CRS rating reflects the degree to which the community (i.e., the locality) has undertaken floodplain and watershed management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements. Flood insurance premium discounts for residents range from 5 percent for a Class 9 rating to 45 percent for a Class 1 rating.
The CRS is the only program "designed to encourage communities to proactively reduce their flood risks" (100 Resilient Cities, 2017, p. 5) . However, the CRS is a voluntary program and there are significant barriers to entry for many localities. Currently, about six percent of NFIP communities participate in the CRS (Environmental Defense Fund, 2017) and only one community has achieved the highest CRS Class 1 rating, receiving an average flood insurance premium discount in the SFHA of $963 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017a).
CRS rewards localities for activities that reduce flood hazards while protecting the natural and beneficial functions of flood-prone land (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015a).
The CRS rating can be increased by investing in infrastructure improvements that increase resilience to flooding. For example, CRS rewards investments in preservation and restoration of natural infrastructure (like wetlands and vegetated shorelines) and investment in green infrastructure (such as bioswales, permeable pavements, cisterns, or stormwater planters) that offer protection against damage from flooding and reduce flood losses (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015) . 4 Highfield and Brody (2017) find that communities participating in the CRS experience more than a 40% reduction in flood claims relative to communities that do not participate.
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Green infrastructure uses natural features and processes, and engineered controls to reduce runoff volume through infiltration, evapotranspiration, or rainwater harvesting (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015) .Green infrastructure involving open space, wetlands, floodplains, and woodlands, and/or using such green infrastructure to support natural floodplain functions contribute to higher CRS ratings. Preserving or restoring floodplains such as through natural floodwater storage can also contribute to improved CRS ratings.
CRS also encourages infrastructure management that minimizes future flood damages such
as by preserving open space, protecting national floodplain functions, and regulating development in the floodplain and in the watershed. Localities can improve their CRS rating by focusing on planning and development functions that emphasize infrastructure-related decisions to reduce flood losses in existing development. They may include improving drainage system maintenance efforts, addressing repetitively-flooded properties, and adopting higher building code standards and stormwater management regulation.
In the next section, we document recent flood losses in the U.S. and the related increase in NFIP debt and disaster aid spending, followed by a section that describes the low flood insurance participation rate with case studies of two recent flood disasters that illustrate the low participation rate, amounts of flood insurance and disaster aid paid, and uncovered losses borne by homeowners.
The subsequent section describes decades of attempts by the NFIP to increase the participation rate and argues for expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond the current high risk zone. The final section discusses the benefits of expanding the mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement. We conclude with a brief discussion of the policy landscape and how flood insurance policy changes may come about to improve flood resilience in a world made wetter due to climate change and sea level rise.
Flood Losses in the U.S., NFIP, and Disaster Aid
Flood is the most frequent and costly among natural disasters in the U.S. (100 Resilient Cities, 2017; Casey, 2017) . Table 1 shows NFIP claims for major flood events after Hurricane Sandy (through 2016). (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2013 ). This trajectory of increasing federal disaster aid is not sustainable (Englander, 2013) . We argue that increasing the number of properties required to purchase flood insurance is preferable to disaster aid for financing recovery after flood loss and also promotes more sustainable rebuilding.
Low Flood Insurance Participation Rates
This section documents low flood insurance participation rates and presents case studies of Note: Percentages shown reflect the ratio of the number of total flood insurance policies in the county to the total housing units in the county. As shown in Table 2 
Case 2: Hurricane Harvey in August 2017
We also use the case study of Hurricane Harvey, which caused significant flooding in • subsidizing flood insurance premiums
• making flood insurance mandatory for structures in SFHAs with mortgages from federallybacked lending institutions
• providing incentives for private insurance companies and agents to promote flood insurance purchase
• requiring flood insurance as a condition for receiving disaster aid in some cases
• sponsoring media efforts to reduce the confusion of those who think their homeowners' 18 insurance covers flood loss Flood insurance premiums were heavily subsidized with the goal of increasing participation for years after the program began. Hurricane Camille in 1969 resulted in substantial flood damage and brought attention to how few people had purchased flood insurance, as only two communities were participating in NFIP at the time (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014) . For the 1972
Hurricane Agnes, less than one percent of insurable damages were covered by flood insurance (Anderson, 1974) . In Pennsylvania, the hardest hit state, some of the most flooded areas had no NFIP policies and there were less than 700 policies in force in the entire state (Anderson, 1974) . 
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Mortgage lenders can be fined for failing to require flood insurance purchase, but many do not, either because they believe they are unlikely to be fined or because loans are typically sold off, repackaged, securitized and fall between the cracks (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014; Spencer & Hoyer, 2017) .
The NFIP also provides an incentive to motivate private insurers and their agents to market flood insurance, with the main goal of increasing the participation rate. and operating expenses) but play no risk-bearing role (Fier et al., 2014; King, 2005) . However, the participation rate increase was relatively modest in the ten years after the WYO program began.
The low participation rate may also be due to the expected flow of flood disaster aid, which is explained by a type of moral hazard known as "charity hazard" (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kousky et al., 2013; Raschky et al., 2013; Raschky & Weck-Hannemann, 2007) . Homeowners may rationally decide not to insure against natural disaster, such as flood, because they expect "free" help will come, particularly in the form of disaster aid. Over the last few decades, large-scale natural disasters followed by massive flows of federal disaster aid to damaged regions have promulgated this expectation. Recognizing that the demand for flood insurance can be crowded out by expected aid, the NFIP has made attempts to link the receiving of disaster aid to the purchase of flood insurance. However, various studies find that enforcement and compliance is low In addition, the U.S. participation rate for flood insurance is low because insurance coverage is fragmented and confusing. Homeowners' insurance, which does not include flood coverage, is only available from private insurers and flood coverage is generally only available from the NFIP. 6 After every major flood disaster, the media documents cases of property owners who assumed that their homeowners' insurance covered flood damage or that they cannot purchase flood insurance unless their property is in a high flood risk zone (Feinman, 2013; Stempel, 2013) .
Extensive public education campaigns do not appear to have alleviated this confusion to any significant extent.
Even after decades attempts to increase the flood insurance participation rate, the number 
Benefits of an Increased Participation Rate
This Commentary proposes to expand the NFIP flood insurance requirement beyond properties with federally-backed mortgages in the 100-year floodplain to include all property in the 500-year floodplain. This expansion will result in beneficial effects such as alleviating the NFIP debt problem and reducing federal disaster aid payments and out-of-pocket losses by flood victims. We also expect that expanded flood insurance requirements will generate pressure for localities to participate in the Community Rating System (CRS) and make infrastructure improvements and management decisions that increase flood resilience. While our proposed expansion of the flood insurance purchase requirements is unlikely to correct the problem of inaccurate or outdated FIRMs, it may impact development within the floodplain by making more explicit the costs and risks of building and living in high risk areas.
NFIP Debt, Federal Disaster Aid, and Out-of-pocket Losses by Flood Victims
The NFIP was created to provide flood insurance in the U.S., which was not being offered by the private market, with the understanding that communities would take proactive steps to guard against future flood damage. The only property owners required to have flood insurance are in SFHAs A national study by RAND found that only about one percent of homeowners outside SFHAs purchase flood insurance (Dixon et al., 2006) . The result is a risk pool with an unsustainable proportion of high flood risk policies. This is analogous to a health insurance risk pool with only older, less healthy policyholders. Insurance companies have always faced the 23 adverse selection problem: individuals and entities with higher risk exposures tend to purchase more insurance coverage. The goal of insurance underwriting is to overcome the adverse selection problem by screening potential policyholders and creating a risk pool not dominated by higher risk exposures. By design, the NFIP pool will be unbalanced because the only properties required to purchase NFIP policies are in high risk areas. In effect, the current NFIP structure mandates adverse selection.
Increasing the number and risk diversity of properties covered by the NFIP through an 
Community Rating System (CRS)
Another benefit of making the flood insurance purchase mandatory for all properties in the 500-year floodplain is that it will incentivize more localities to participate in the CRS and for those 8 Properties covered by an NFIP policy that are damaged by flood may be required to reduce future flood damage before repairing or rebuilding. Policyholders can get up to $30,000 in Increased Cost of Compliance coverage to help pay costs to bring the property into compliance with their community's floodplain ordinance.
24 already participating to improve their CRS Class rating. If more property owners are required to purchase insurance, then more residents will pressure their local governments to improve the CRS rating to reduce flood insurance premiums for the entire community. CRS ratings improvements generally require investment by the city, and is a cost borne by the city that benefits property owners in the form of lower flood insurance premiums, but does not directly benefit the city itself.
As such, pressure to improve CRS ratings needs to come from those who will benefit, since city government mainly sees it as an expense (100 Resilient Cities, 2017) .
Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs)
A major problem facing the NFIP is inaccurate FIRMs which are used to price flood insurance. FIRMs are based on historical flood data and have become outdated in many communities, as NFIP flood risk mapping has had a "history of haphazard technical updates" (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014, p. 344) . As a result, FIRMs do not accurately represent current or future flood risks (100 Resilient Cities, 2017; Hayat & Moore, 2015; Revkin, 2017 Requiring flood insurance to be purchased for more properties will not improve the accuracy of FIRMs, but will benefit owners who suffer flood loss and would not have had flood insurance without the requirement. In addition, owners of a properties required to purchase flood insurance will invest more in modifications that lower the flood risk for a specific property to receive premium discounts for that specific property and push their local government to make efforts to increase the CRS score, which reduces flood risk and premiums for the community.
At the local government level, expanded NFIP requirements would also better manage development within the floodplain by making more explicit the costs and risks of building and living in high risk areas. FIRMs have been used beyond their stated purpose of pricing flood insurance, being used instead for making decisions with much longer-term consequences, such as infrastructure investment and land-use decisions (100 Resilient Cities, 2017) . When FIRMs are outdated and inaccurate, decision makers (local government, developers, residents) have inadequate information about their current and future exposure to risks, and as a result may make under-informed decisions about where to allow development, where and how to build, or where to buy property (Hayat & Moore, 2015) . " [D] evelopers and individuals are using imperfect 26 information to make choices about where to buy and develop. Many homeowners are not adequately informed about the risk of flooding when making decisions about purchasing a home or whether to carry flood insurance after their mortgages are paid off" (100 Resilient Cities, 2017, p. 8) . Furthermore, when such information remains skewed in favor of development in the floodplain, the result has ripple effects in terms of where roads, cables and wires, pipelines and other infrastructure need to be built (Revkin, 2017) .
Getting to Policy Change
Increasing the NFIP mandate would involve substantial policy change, which will likely require a tipping point, or a confluence of actors, options, and events that raise the saliency of the NFIP issue beyond 'business as usual.' Such a tipping point can be driven by a focusing event,
for example, a large-scale disaster, that amplifies attention to a problem. If we think about the policy situation using Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams framework, the focusing event then needs to be coupled with a policy window, which in turn requires an agreed-upon problem, identifiable solution, and political climate that encourages action.
Flooding and its associated social and economic impacts can serve as focusing events, but there is little evidence that recent floods have opened a policy window. The South Carolina flooding and Hurricane Harvey have focused attention on the consequences of flooding, but this visibility has not been associated with policy entrepreneurs, actors with the knowledge, connections, political power, tenacity and even luck to be able to exploit windows of opportunity for policy change and heightened levels of attention to specific problems to promote their policy solutions (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996) , who can connect the problem with solutions and political capital. Creating and taking advantage of the policy window can be 27 problematic because disaster relief, and not flood insurance, is the consistent issue raised after a flooding event. The policy domain contains a loose community of actors who are involved only episodically and are dominated by local and state interests and preferences for disaster relief writ large, regardless of source (e.g., NFIP or disaster aid). The lack of an organized and coherent advocacy coalition 10 means there are few voices to push for alternative pre-disaster solutions such as increased reliance on flood insurance, and not simply the delivery of aid post-disaster.
Better management of flood losses requires a shift in post-disaster policy mobilization away from disaster relief toward proactive flood loss mitigation, including improved insurance programs and investment in protective infrastructure. This can be addressed by coalescing a stronger advocacy coalition, which can include technical experts, floodplain managers, planning organizations, emergency management professionals, and others. The coalition may draw policymakers at all levels (local, state, federal) by capitalizing on existing concerns regarding the ballooning cost of disaster aid and the size of the NFIP debt, in addition to playing to the concerns or sympathies of policymakers who have had 'bad experiences' with federal flood disaster aid.
What is lacking, however, is a policy entrepreneur with the political capital to pull a coalition together. One possibility may be a leading legislator from a recently flood ravaged state who steps up and leads the charge, given the currency of the issue being experienced with the recent, widespread flooding. Floodplain managers, as a group of professionals and technical experts, could also become policy entrepreneurs. 10 An advocacy coalition is a group of actors that interact with an element of constancy in a specific policy domain, e.g. hurricanes or flood disasters. Members of the coalition often share the same belief system and the common goal of changing policy or government action and/or bringing about policy reform (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987) . 
